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INTRODUCTION
Mounting evidence demonstrates that retail investors make predictable,
costly mistakes.1 They save too little, they trade too frequently, they buy
high and sell low, they invest in fad instruments they do not understand,
and they pay excessive fees. In an August 2012, 200-page study prepared in
response to a Dodd–Frank2 mandate, the Securities & Exchange Commission (SEC) concluded that “American investors lack basic financial literacy.”3
The study found that investors do not understand basic concepts such as
diversification, investment costs, inflation, and compound interest, and that
they lack the knowledge necessary to protect themselves from fraud.4
Despite investors’ seemingly limited competence, regulatory and market
developments increasingly require retail investors to navigate the financial
markets themselves. Over the past thirty-five years, participant-directed
401(k) plans have largely replaced professionally managed pension plans.5
Unlike traditional pension plans, participant-directed 401(k) plans place the
responsibility for critical investment decisions in the hands of employees,
who select their own investments from a menu of employer-provided
alternatives. This means that low-level employees—individuals with even

1 See, e.g., Andrea Frazzini & Owen A. Lamont, Dumb Money: Mutual Fund Flows and the
Cross-Section of Stock Returns, 88 J. FIN. ECON. 299, 319 (2008) (concluding that “individual
investors have a striking ability to do the wrong thing”).
2 Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124
Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 7, 12, and 15 U.S.C.).
3 OFFICE OF INVESTOR E DUC. & A DVOCACY, SEC, STAFF S TUDY REGARDING
FINANCIAL LITERACY AMONG INVESTORS 15 (2012) [hereinafter SEC STAFF STUDY],
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2012/917-financial-literacy-study-part1.pdf.
4 Id.
5 See Pamela Perun & Joseph John Valenti, Defined Benefit Plans: Going, Going, Gone? 4 & fig.1
(2008), available at http://planetnow.com/metaPage/lib/Perun-ValentiFinalAppam.pdf (“In 1975,
over 70% of active employees participated in a defined benefit plan. In 2005, the majority of active
employees (over 75%) participated in a defined contribution plan instead.”).
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less investment knowledge than the general population6—are now investing
for retirement with almost no guidance.
To complicate matters further, mutual funds are the dominant investment option provided by employer-sponsored 401(k) plans and the primary
way in which retail investors participate in the stock market, both in and
outside of retirement plans.7 Unlike other equity investments, notably stock,
mutual funds are held primarily by individual investors.8 This market
segmentation means that retail fund investors cannot benefit from the
market discipline exercised by more sophisticated institutions.9
As a result, there are reasons to doubt the efficiency of the mutual fund
market and to ask whether the market offers retail investors reasonable and
comprehensible investment options. In particular, many commentators are
puzzled by the large number of fund choices and by the persistence of highfee funds that underperform the market.10
Congress, the SEC, the Department of Labor, and the courts have
struggled with the possibility that market forces are insufficient to protect
retail investors from making poor investment decisions. Regulatory responses designed to protect investors include mandated disclosure requirements, product limits, and the imposition of fiduciary duties on employers,
brokers, and investment advisers. Widespread litigation over the role of
judicial oversight of mutual fund fees and the scope of employer obligations
in designing retirement plans raises questions about the manner in which
individuals make investment decisions. In one such high profile case,
Seventh Circuit Judges Richard Posner and Frank Easterbrook, although
6 Cf. SEC STAFF STUDY, supra note 3, at 15 (“In particular, surveys demonstrate that certain
subgroups, including women, African-Americans, Hispanics, the oldest segment of the elderly
population, and those who are poorly educated, have an even greater [lack] of investment
knowledge than the average general population.”).
7 See INV. CO. INST., 2013 INVESTMENT COMPANY FACT B OOK 95 (53d ed. 2013) [hereinafter ICI FACT BOOK], available at http://www.icifactbook.org/pdf/2013_factbook.pdf (stating
that, in 2012, seventy-two percent of mutual fund–holding households owned mutual fund shares
inside retirement plans).
8 See id. at 90 (explaining that households owned eighty-nine percent of total mutual fund
assets as of the end of 2012). Institutional use of mutual funds is limited and consists mostly of
money market funds, which are used for cash management. See id. at 105-06.
9 Some mutual funds operate multiple versions that are sold to retail and institutional investors. Although institutional “twins” typically charge lower fees than retail funds, one study found
that retail funds with an institutional twin perform better, which suggests that, in this context,
retail investors can benefit from the market discipline imposed by institutions. See generally
Richard B. Evans & Rüdiger Fahlenbrach, Institutional Investors and Mutual Fund Governance:
Evidence from Retail–Institutional Fund Twins, 25 REV. FIN. STUD. 3530 (2012).
10 See, e.g., PETER J. WALLISON & ROBERT E. LITAN, COMPETITIVE EQUITY : A BETTER W AY TO ORGANIZE MUTUAL FUNDS 8-9 (2007) (observing that the mutual fund industry
“does not appear to conform to the ‘law of one price’”).
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reaching opposite conclusions about investor behavior, each suggested that
the manner in which such decisions are made is critical to evaluating the
appropriate level of regulatory intervention.11
The importance of understanding investor behavior is not limited to the
litigation context. With employees’ increasing dependence on their 401(k)
plans to deliver retirement income, employers are rethinking issues such as
plan structure and the choice of investment options.12 BrightScope’s highly
publicized online ratings and rankings of 401(k) plans have heightened
employer attention to the importance of plan design.13
Congress has recently acknowledged the need for a better understanding
of investor behavior. In the Dodd–Frank Act, Congress instructed the SEC
to conduct a study of investor financial literacy.14 The SEC’s study was
conducted at the most superficial level, however, and provided limited
insight into developing future regulatory policy.15 Although the SEC found
investor mistakes and misconceptions, it did not seek to identify the reasons
for these mistakes or to understand the underlying mechanisms driving
investor choices.16
This Article takes up where the SEC study left off. We report the results
of an experiment designed to explore how investors use the information
provided to them, and why they often ignore it. Using a simulated investment
game in which participants were asked to allocate funds in a retirement
account among ten mutual fund alternatives, we offer some insights into
11 Compare Jones v. Harris Assocs. L.P., 527 F.3d 627, 631-32 (7th Cir. 2008) (Easterbrook, J.)
(reasoning that market discipline should constrain excessive mutual fund fees by driving investors
away from costly funds), with Jones v. Harris Assocs. L.P., 537 F.3d 728, 731-32 (7th Cir. 2008)
(Posner, J., dissenting) (questioning whether high fees actually drive investors away), denying reh’g
en banc to 527 F.3d 627. The Supreme Court vacated the Seventh Circuit decision without
resolving the question. See Jones v. Harris Assocs. L.P., 130 S. Ct. 1418, 1430-31 (2010) (“The
debate between the Seventh Circuit panel and the dissent from the denial of rehearing regarding
today’s mutual fund market is a matter for Congress, not the courts.”).
12 See, e.g., AON HEWITT, 2011 TRENDS & EXPERIENCE IN DEFINED CONTRIBUTION
PLANS: PAVING THE ROAD TO RETIREMENT (2011), available at http://www.aon.com/
attachments/thought-leadership/2011_Trends_Experience_Executive_Summary_v5.pdf (explaining emerging trends in plan design and administration).
13 See, e.g., Ron Lieber, Spotlighting 401(k) Plans, Thanklessly, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 17, 2011, at B1
(describing attention received by BrightScope ratings and criticisms of its methodology);
Christine P. Roberts, Your 401(k) Plan’s Online Report Card—and What to Do About It, E IS FOR
ERISA (Oct. 5, 2011, 7:49 PM), http://eforerisa.wordpress.com/2011/10/05/your-401k-plans-onlinereport-card-and-what-to-do-about-it (providing advice to employers on addressing a low BrightScope rating).
14 Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 917,
124 Stat. 1376, 1836 (2010).
15 See generally SEC STAFF S TUDY, supra note 3.
16 See id. at iii-vii.
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how individuals seek and assimilate information about a fund’s characteristics. In particular, our experiment offers a novel addition to the body of
experimental evidence on investor decisionmaking by incorporating a
technology that allows us to collect data on the specific information that
investors choose to view.
In addition to collecting general information about the process by which
investors choose among mutual fund options, we employ an experimental
manipulation to test the effect of an instruction on the importance of
mutual fund fees. Pairing this instruction with simplified fee disclosure
allows us to distinguish between motivation limits and cognition limits as
explanations for the widespread findings that investors ignore fees in their
investment decisions.
Our results offer partial, limited grounds for optimism. On the one
hand, within our simplified experimental construct, our subjects allocated
more money, on average, to higher-value funds. Furthermore, subjects who
received the Fees instruction paid closer attention to mutual fund fees and
allocated their investments into funds with lower fees. On the other hand,
the effects of even a blunt fee instruction were limited, and investors were
unable to identify and avoid clearly inferior fund options. In addition, our
results suggest that excessive and naïve diversification strategies are driving
many investment decisions.
Our findings are concededly preliminary. More important, because of
the simplified nature of our experiment, our results may not fully explain
real-world investment decisions, in which the stakes and the cost of gathering and evaluating investment information are much higher. Nonetheless,
our research offers a starting point in terms of both understanding investor
behavior and evaluating efforts to improve the quality of investor decisions.
In particular, determining whether effective investor education is possible is
critical to evaluating the manner in which we regulate, structure, and
evaluate retail investing options such as retirement plans.
The Article is organized as follows. Part I briefly describes the regulatory
environment for mutual funds and 401(k) retirement plans. Part II identifies
key findings on retail investor decisionmaking and observes how these
findings cast doubt on the effectiveness of market discipline in the mutual
fund market. Part III describes our experiment structure. Part IV reports
our results. Part V explores the implications of our findings and identifies
next steps for additional research.

610

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 162: 605

I. THE REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT FOR
MUTUAL FUNDS AND 401(k) PLANS
A. Mutual Funds
Mutual funds are the dominant investment vehicle for retail investors.17
A mutual fund is a pool of assets that may include stocks, bonds, and other
investment products. A mutual fund investor purchases shares that represent a pro rata ownership interest in the fund’s pool of assets. The fund is
required to value its assets on a daily basis and to purchase and sell fund
shares at their net asset value (NAV).18
At the end of 2012, there were over 7596 mutual funds in the United
States.19 Mutual funds are typically categorized according to the types of
assets in which they invest. These include funds that invest primarily in
equity, funds confined to fixed income investments, and hybrid funds that
combine the two. Funds may be actively managed or seek to replicate the
performance of an index, such as the S&P 500. Some funds focus on a
particular segment of the market, like energy stocks or pharmaceuticals;
others invest in specific asset classes, like large cap equities or junk bonds.
International funds purchase assets from across the globe or within a
specific foreign country or geographic region. Target date funds offer a
shifting mix of equities and fixed income assets that becomes more conservative as the specified target date approaches.20
Mutual funds do not typically hire employees to make investment decisions or perform administrative services.21 Instead, funds outsource all
operational requirements to outside service providers. The funds pass on
the costs of these services to the funds’ shareholders in the form of various
fees. Funds’ fees can include sales fees (also known as “loads”), management
17 See ICI FACT B OOK, supra note 7, at 90 (noting that “53.8 million households, or 44 percent of all U.S. households, owned mutual funds” in 2012). The global economic importance of
mutual funds is even greater. The Investment Company Institute reported 73,243 mutual funds
worldwide, holding almost $27 trillion in assets at the end of 2012. Id. at 201 tbl.61, 202 tbl.62.
18 For a general description of mutual funds, see Jill E. Fisch, Rethinking the Regulation of
Securities Intermediaries, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1961, 1967-75 (2010).
19 ICI FACT BOOK, supra note 7, at 142 tbl.1. In addition to funds, there were over 1194 exchange-traded funds (ETF) as of the end of 2012. Id. at 155 tbl.14. ETFs differ from mutual funds
on several key features—including the manner in which they trade—but offer investors a similar
type of diversified investment. See Fisch, supra note 18, at 1978-82.
20 Target date funds are often used for retirement investing. See Fisch, supra note 18, at 2022-24.
21 See, e.g., William A. Birdthistle, Compensating Power: An Analysis of Rents and Rewards in the
Mutual Fund Industry, 80 TUL. L. REV. 1401, 1409 (2006) (“The typical mutual fund is a
rudimentary legal vessel into which shareholders contribute money and over which a board of
trustees governs; the fund has no offices, no equipment, and no employees.”).
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fees, distribution (12b-1) fees, and administrative expenses.22 Of these fees,
the largest are management fees, which are paid to the funds’ investment
advisers. In addition to these fees, a fund may have less transparent expenses,
such as trading commissions. The cost of commissions is not included in the
funds’ tables of fees, but is also borne by the funds’ shareholders.23 The
complexity of fund fee structures makes it difficult to calculate costs or
compare different funds.24
As of 2012, forty-four percent of U.S. households, or 53.8 million households, owned mutual funds.25 Mutual fund investing is not limited to
wealthy or sophisticated retail investors; to the contrary, in 2012, most
mutual fund–owning households had incomes of less than $100,000.26 The
relative lack of sophistication among mutual fund investors has led Congress and the SEC to regulate mutual funds strictly.
The SEC oversees the operation of mutual funds, which are regulated
by the Investment Company Act of 1940 (ICA).27 Among the regulations
imposed on mutual funds are extensive disclosure requirements, including
disclosure of a fund’s investment objectives, costs, investment strategies, and
advisers.28 Funds are restricted in their investments, in their use of leverage,
and in the manner in which they compensate their investment advisers.29
The ICA also requires mutual funds to have a board of directors, at least
forty percent of whom must be independent of the fund’s investment

22 OFFICE OF INVESTOR EDUC. & ADVOCACY, SEC, MUTUAL FUNDS: A G UIDE FOR
INVESTORS 12-15 (2007), available at http://www.sec.gov./investor/pubs/sec-guide-to-mutualfunds.pdf.
23 Fisch, supra note 18 at 1996-98.
24 As one commentator has observed, the complexity of fee structures may allow mutual
funds to resist competitive pressure by preventing retail investors from understanding fund
pricing. Bruce I. Carlin, Strategic Price Complexity in Retail Financial Markets, 91 J. FIN. E CON. 278,
283 (2009).
25 ICI FACT BOOK, supra note 7, at 90. Mutual fund ownership has increased dramatically over
the past thirty years. In 1980, less than six percent of U.S. households owned mutual funds. Id.
26 Id. at 94. Only thirty-nine percent of mutual fund–owning households had incomes over
$100,000, and the median income for mutual fund–holding households was $80,000. Id.
27 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to -64 (2006 & Supp. V 2012).
28 Fisch, supra note 18, at 1968-69.
29 Id. at 1970-72.
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adviser.30 Finally, the ICA requires a fund’s shareholders to elect the
directors and to approve certain structural changes.31
The extensive regulation of mutual funds is a direct response to concerns about investor exploitation and the inability of market forces to
protect investors adequately. According to SEC estimates, investors in
mutual funds lost forty percent of their investments between 1929 and
1936.32 Congress found, relying on an SEC study, that mutual fund sponsors
were acting largely out of self-interest, abandoning their fiduciary duties to
investors and charging investors with unjustified costs and expenses.33 The
ICA was Congress’s response to that problem.34
Nevertheless, the problem of mutual funds charging excessive fees continued. In 1966, the SEC reported to Congress that neither the ICA nor
market discipline provided mutual fund investors with sufficient protection
against excessive costs.35 The SEC noted that the problem was exacerbated
by the fact that mutual funds were sold primarily to “family m[e]n of
moderate income.”36 In response, the SEC recommended that the ICA be
amended to limit investment advisers to a “reasonable” fee for their management services and “that this standard be enforceable in the courts.”37
Congress adopted the SEC’s recommendation and included § 36(b) in
the 1970 revisions to the ICA. Section 36(b) imposes a fiduciary duty upon
investment advisers with respect to compensation received from a mutual
fund and provides investors with a private right of action to enforce this

30 Id. at 1967. SEC rules set a higher threshold, requiring fund boards to have a majority of
independent directors in order for the fund to qualify for certain exemptive rules. See Role of
Independent Directors of Investment Companies, Securities Act Release No. 7932, Exchange Act
Release No. 43,786, Investment Company Act Release No. 24,816, 66 Fed. Reg. 3734, 3736 ( Jan.
16, 2001) (codified as amended in scattered parts of 17 C.F.R.).
31 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-13 & -16. Unlike operating companies, mutual funds need not provide
annual meetings for the election of directors.
32 Paul Roye, Dir., Div. of Inv. Mgmt., SEC, Opening Remarks at a Celebration of the 60th
Anniversary of the Investment Company Act (Oct. 4, 2000), available at www.sec.gov/news/
speech/spch405.htm.
33 Id.
34 Id.
35 See SEC, PUBLIC POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF INVESTMENT COMPANY GROWTH,
H.R. REP. NO. 89-2337, at viii (2d Sess. 1966) (“[M]utual fund shareholders need protection
against incurring excessive costs in the acquisition and management of their investments
and . . . , given the structure and incentives prevailing in the industry, neither competition nor
the few elementary safeguards against conflict of interest deemed sufficient in 1940 and contained
in the [ICA] presently provide this protection in adequate measure.”).
36 Id. at ix.
37 Id. at viii.
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duty.38 Today, fees are far lower than they were in the 1960s, and, according
to the Investment Company Institute, most new investments are made in
funds that charge lower fees.39 Nonetheless, mutual fund fees continue to
vary significantly. The New York Times reports, based on data from the
Investment Company Institute, that the average expense ratio for equity
mutual funds is 1.44%,40 but fees range from 0.05%41 to more than 2%.42
Although one might imagine that competitive markets would make it
difficult for investors to raise legal challenges to fees they voluntarily
elected to pay, suits against mutual fund advisers alleging excessive fees are
surprisingly common.43 To date, no court has held an adviser liable in socalled “§ 36(b)” litigation,44 but one commentator estimates that the defense
and settlement of these lawsuits cost the mutual fund industry about $400
million per year.45 To a certain extent, this litigation pits the legal standard
of fiduciary obligation against the effectiveness of market discipline.
This tension was recently exposed in the Seventh Circuit opinions in
Jones v. Harris Associates L.P.46 The panel majority in Jones viewed extensive
judicial oversight of fee levels as inappropriate, reasoning that “investors
can and do protect their interests by shopping, and that regulating advisory
fees through litigation is unlikely to do more good than harm.”47 Critical to
the court’s analysis was an assessment of the role of investor decisions in
constraining fees. As Judge Posner observed in his dissent from the denial of

38 Investment Company Amendments Act of 1970, § 20, Pub. L. No. 91-547, 84 Stat. 1413,
1428-30 (1970) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(b) (2012)); see also Jones v. Harris
Assocs. L.P., 130 S. Ct. 1418, 1423 (2010).
39 ICI FACT BOOK, supra note 7, at 75-76.
40 Anna Bernasek, What a Difference a Percentage Point Can Make, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7, 2012, at BU18.
41 See, e.g., Vanguard 500 Index Fund Admiral Shares, VANGUARD, https://personal.vanguard.com/
us/funds/snapshot?FundId=0540&FundIntExt=INT (last visited Jan. 24, 2014) (reporting the expense ratio as of April 12, 2013, for those investing a minimum of $10,000).
42 See, e.g., AllianceBernstein Blended Style Funds Tax-Managed International Portfolio, ALLIANCE BERNSTEIN, https://www.alliancebernstein.com/abcom/Product_Center/3_Vehicle/MF/
Equity/Core/Tax-Mgd_International_Portfolio.htm?+=performance (last visited Jan. 24, 2014)
(click “Performance” tab) (reporting net and gross expense ratios of 2.40% as of January 31, 2013).
43 See M. Todd Henderson, Justifying Jones, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 1027, 1033 (2010) (finding
that more than 100 lawsuits have been filed since 1970, when the ICA was amended to provide a
private right of action under § 36(b)); Quinn Curtis & John Morley, An Empirical Study of Mutual
Fund Excessive Fee Litigation: Do the Merits Matter?, 30 J.L. E CON. & ORG. (forthcoming 2014)
(manuscript at 2), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1852652 (reporting, from 2000 to 2009,
ninety-one investor suits against mutual fund advisers alleging excessive fees).
44 Henderson, supra note 43, at 1033.
45 Id. at 1043.
46 527 F.3d 627 (7th Cir.), reh’g denied, 537 F.3d 728 (7th Cir. 2008) (en banc), and vacated and
remanded, 130 S. Ct. 1418 (2010).
47 Id. at 634.
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the petition for rehearing en banc, the court’s reasoning raised an important
empirical question: “[W]ill high fees drive investors away?”48
The Supreme Court in Jones did not resolve what one commentator
terms “the sharp disagreement between two leading market-oriented jurists”
about the operation of the market for mutual funds.49 Empirical studies
have begun to try to answer this question, and the study we report in Part
III adds to that growing literature.
B. 401(k) Plans
Courts and policymakers are increasingly concerned with mutual fund
investment decisionmaking, because mutual funds are the primary vehicle
for employee retirement savings. Over the past forty years, employee
retirement savings plans50 have largely shifted from defined benefit pension
plans51 to defined contribution plans52—primarily 401(k) plans.53 This shift
has transferred responsibility for investment decisions from the employer to
individual employees. Although the employees direct the investment of
their retirement funds in a 401(k) plan, the employer selects the menu of
investment options available, thus limiting the employees’ allocations to the
choices provided.54
So-called “participant control” allows the employer to reduce its liability
exposure. Specifically, § 404(c) of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) exempts fiduciaries from liability for losses
caused by participants’ exercise of control over assets in their individual
48
49

537 F.3d at 731 (Posner, J., dissenting).
Larry E. Ribstein, Federal Misgovernance of Mutual Funds, 2009–2010 CATO SUP. CT.
REV. 301, 316. The Supreme Court did not attempt to resolve this question. See Jones, 130 S. Ct. at
1430-31 (“The debate between the Seventh Circuit panel and the dissent from the denial of
rehearing regarding today’s mutual fund market is a matter for Congress, not the courts.”).
50 Employee retirement plans are regulated by the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001–1461 (2006 & Supp. V 2012).
51 Defined benefit plans, the category encompassing most traditional pension plans, “generally
promise[] the participant a fixed level of retirement income, which is typically based on the
employee’s years of service and compensation.” LaRue v. DeWolff, Boberg & Assocs., 552 U.S.
248, 250 n.1 (2008).
52 Defined contribution plans “promise[] the participant the value of an individual account at
retirement, which is largely a function of the amounts contributed to that account and the
investment performance of those contributions.” Id.
53 See id. at 255 (“Defined contribution plans dominate the retirement plan scene today.”);
Edward A. Zelinsky, The Defined Contribution Paradigm, 114 YALE L.J. 451, 471 (2004) (“[I]n the
years before ERISA, the traditional defined benefit plan was the dominant device for retirement
savings.”).
54 For an analysis of the effect of providing a menu of alternatives as well as the importance
of the menu choices provided, see Ian Ayres, Menus Matter, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 3 (2006).
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accounts.55 As of February 2012, the Department of Labor estimated that 72
million individuals are covered by 401(k) plans in which individual participants are responsible for directing the investment of their retirement
savings.56
ERISA does not restrict the types of investments that an employer may
offer through a 401(k) plan. The options commonly include mutual funds,
money market funds, real estate accounts, stable value funds, and company
stock.57 In order to obtain the benefit of ERISA’s § 404(c) safe harbor, a
plan must offer investors at least three “diversified” investment options with
“materially different risk and return characteristics.”58 Most 401(k) plans
offer employees substantially more options. According to BrightScope, in
2011, the average 401(k) plan offered employees twenty-four investment
options.59 Some plans offer hundreds or even thousands of choices.60
Approximately half of all 401(k) plan assets are invested in mutual funds.61
Employers usually delegate the administration of their 401(k) plans to
an independent service provider, which may be a bank, an investment
company, or an insurance company.62 The service provider acts as a trustee
for the plan, bundles various administrative functions for the employer, and
helps the employer select the investment options. One study reports that
mutual fund families act as trustees for seventy-seven percent of plans.63
Although many service providers include funds from outside the trustee’s
family, affiliated funds tend to dominate the product lines of mutual fund
trustees. Commentators have identified the selection of the trustee’s own
product line as a potential conflict of interest and have also found that
55
56

29 U.S.C. § 1104(c) (2006 & Supp. V 2012); see also 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-1 (2012).
EMP. BENEFITS SEC. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’ T OF LABOR, FACT SHEET: FINAL RULE
TO IMPROVE T RANSPARENCY OF FEES AND EXPENSES TO WORKERS IN 401(K)-TYPE
RETIREMENT P LANS (2012), available at http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/pdf/fsparticipantfeerule.pdf.
57 U.S. GOV’T A CCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-291, 401(K) P LANS: CERTAIN INVESTMENT OPTIONS AND PRACTICES THAT MAY RESTRICT WITHDRAWALS NOT WIDELY
UNDERSTOOD 8-9 & tbl.1 (2011) [hereinafter 2011 GAO REPORT], available at http://
www.gao.gov/assets/320/316437.pdf.
58 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404c-1(b)(3)(i)(B).
59 Jack Hough, Getting the Most from a Lame 401(k) Retirement Plan, WALL ST. J., Oct. 8-9,
2011, at B7.
60 See, e.g., Hecker v. Deere & Co., 556 F.3d 575, 581 (7th Cir. 2009) (describing Deere &
Co.’s plan as offering more than 2500 investment options).
61 Sarah Holden & David Abbey, Fortune’s Assessment of Industry Stance on 401(k) Fees Is Misguided, ICI VIEWPOINTS ( June 25, 2012), http://www.ici.org/viewpoints/view_12_fortune_
401k_fees.
62 2011 GAO REPORT, supra note 57, at 6.
63 Veronika K. Pool, Clemens Sialm & Irina Stefanescu, It Pays to Set the Menu: Mutual
Fund Investment Options in 401(k) Plans 9 ( Jan. 20, 2013) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2112263.
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trustees may be less inclined to remove one of their own underperforming
funds from the plan menu.64
Service providers charge various types of fees to 401(k) plan sponsors in
connection with the provision of administrative services.65 Both the amount
and type of fee can vary dramatically among providers.66 A substantial
percentage of plans pass through all or part of fees charged by their service
providers to plan participants.67 In addition to the plan-level fees, participants pay expenses and fees associated with different investment options
offered by the plan, such as mutual fund expenses and transaction fees.
ERISA imposes fiduciary obligations on the sponsor in connection with
the selection of investment options,68 and sponsor contracts with service
providers typically give the sponsor authority for the selection of investment options in the plan.69 As a fiduciary, the sponsor is required to select
and periodically evaluate the plan’s mix and range of investment options.70
In determining whether the sponsor has adhered to its obligations, courts
have considered “the range of investment options and the characteristics of
those included options—including the risk profiles, investment strategies,
and associated fees.”71
Commentators have debated what these fiduciary obligations mean, specifically the extent to which they may require sponsors to choose the lowestcost mutual fund options.72 Commentators have also debated the extent to
64
65

Id. at 1-2, 5, 29-30.
In response to a U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) study finding that many
plan sponsors did not know or understand the fees charged by their plans, the Department of
Labor adopted new regulations, effective in July 2012, requiring detailed fee disclosure from
service providers to plan sponsors. 29 C.F.R. § 2550.408b-2(c)(1) (2012); see also GAO, GAO-12325, 401(K) PLANS: INCREASED EDUCATIONAL OUTREACH AND BROADER OVERSIGHT
MAY HELP REDUCE PLAN FEES 24-28, 44, 48 (2012) [hereinafter 2012 GAO REPORT],
available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/600/590359.pdf (describing employers’ limited awareness
and understanding of plan fees); Mary Beth Franklin, New Fee Disclosure Rules Could Shake Up
401(k) World, INVESTMENTNEWS ( June 24, 2012), http://www.investmentnews.com/article/
20120624/REG/306249994 (describing new disclosure requirements and predicting their effect).
The regulations also required that service providers disclose fee information to plan participants.
29 CFR § 2550.408b-2(c)(1)(iv)–(vi).
66 See 2012 GAO R EPORT, supra note 65, at 7-10.
67 See id. at 16-18, 21.
68 See 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1) (2006) (assigning sponsors the fiduciary duty to, inter alia, “diversify[] the investments of the plan so as to minimize the risk of large losses”).
69 See, e.g., Renfro v. Unisys Corp., 671 F.3d 314, 323 (3d Cir. 2011) (explaining that, under its
contract with the defendant, service provider Fidelity had “no contractual authority to control the
mix and range of investment opinions”).
70 Id. at 326.
71 Id. at 327.
72 See Christopher Carosa, 401k Plan Sponsors and the Mutual Fund Expense Ratio Wild Goose
Chase, FIDUCIARY NEWS ( July 3, 2012), http://www.fiduciarynews.com/2012/07/401k-plan-
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which sponsors effectively minimize investment costs. Although some argue
that retirement plan fees are unduly expensive and that, in particular, the
mutual fund options offered by 401(k) plans are more costly and less
attractive than available alternatives,73 others dispute those claims.74
With the formation of BrightScope in 2009, employers have faced increasing public scrutiny of their 401(k) plans.75 Using a proprietary formula,
BrightScope collects and analyzes publicly available data about thousands of
employer-sponsored 401(k) plans and publishes the results through a series
of online ratings and rankings.76 Although BrightScope claims to include
over 200 separate inputs in its analysis, its methodology focuses primarily
on the speed with which a plan participant can accumulate sufficient savings
to retire.77 This approach has been criticized as skewing BrightScope’s
ratings results in favor of issuers that have highly compensated employees
or generous employer-matching provisions.78 BrightScope does, however,
analyze investment menu quality.79 The BrightScope ratings have generated
substantial publicity and have caused many employers to rethink the
structure of their plans.80

sponsors-and-the-mutual-fund-expense-ratio-wild-goose-chase (“The [Department of Labor] has
been careful to warn plan sponsors not to merely go to the lowest cost provider.”).
73 See, e.g., Scott Cendrowski, The 401(k) Fee Revolution, FORTUNE, July 2, 2012, at 66 (arguing that many 401(k) plans are not competitively priced).
74 See, e.g., Holden & Abbey, supra note 61 (arguing that 401(k) fees pay for services that are
valuable to participants).
75 See Lieber, supra note 13, at B1, B5 (describing BrightScope’s formation and its retirement
plan rating services).
76 Id.
77 See Frequently Asked Questions, Data and Methodology: What Is a BrightScope Rating?,
BRIGHTSCOPE, http://www.brightscope.com/faq/401k-retirement/#WhatRating (last visited Jan.
24, 2014).
78 See, e.g., Amy Feldman, How Good Is Your 401(k)?, BLOOMBERG B USINESSWEEK (Dec.
30, 2009), http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/10_02/b4162060137562.htm (“BrightScope’s list of top 401(k) plans is dominated by industries . . . where the workforce is well-paid
and stable.”); Steve Utkus, Rating Your 401(k), VANGUARD BLOG (March 15, 2010),
http://www.vanguardblog.com/2010/03/15/rating-your-401k (noting that higher-paid workers save
more and that ratings cannot account for discrepancies in participants’ incomes).
79 Press Release, BrightScope, BrightScope Announces the Top 25 San Francisco Area-Based
Companies with the Best 401k Plans (Sept. 17, 2013), available at https://bscp.s3.amazonaws.com/
uploads/press_piece_pdfs/2013826_SF_Top_Plans_AtomicFINAL.pdf (last visited Jan. 24, 2014).
At least one academic study has highlighted major deficiencies in plan-level investment menus. See
Quinn Curtis & Ian Ayres, Measuring Fiduciary and Investor Losses in 401(k) Plans (2013)
(unpublished working paper), available at http://www.law.yale.edu/documents/pdf/cbl/Curtis
Ayres_401kFees%281%29.pdf.
80 See Michelle Rafter, BrightScope Shines a Light on 401(k) Plans, WORKFORCE (March 10,
2010), http://www.workforce.com/articles/brightscope-shines-a-light-on-401-k-plans (reporting
that employers are “making adjustments to their retirement plans because of BrightScope”).
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Courts faced with legal challenges to 401(k) plans have largely focused
on whether employers have offered a sufficient number of different investment options, rather than examining the quality of those options or the
choice architecture. In a number of recent cases, employees have sued their
employers, alleging a breach of fiduciary duty based on the employer’s
failure to select appropriate investment options and, in particular, to offer
mutual fund options with sufficiently low costs.81 In many of these cases,
courts have concluded that the employer has fulfilled its fiduciary obligations merely by offering its employees a sufficient range of investment
options. Market competition and investor choice, the cases suggest, provide
employees with adequate protection.
In Hecker v. Deere & Co., for example, the plan offered employees “a
generous choice of investment options” that included “23 different Fidelity
mutual funds, two investment funds managed by Fidelity Trust, a fund
devoted to Deere’s stock, and a Fidelity-operated facility called BrokerageLink, which gave participants access to some 2,500 additional funds managed by different companies.”82 All the funds “were available on the open
market for the same fee.”83 As the court explained, “[T]he undisputed facts
[left] no room for doubt that the Deere Plans offered a sufficient mix of
investments for their participants. . . . Importantly, all of these funds were
also offered to investors in the general public, and so the expense ratios
necessarily were set against the backdrop of market competition.”84 Similarly,
in Renfro v. Unisys Corp., the Third Circuit concluded that an employer met
its fiduciary obligations by providing an adequate range and mix of investment options—in the case of Unisys, the plan offered “seventy-three
distinct investment options.”85
In contrast, the court in Braden v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. refused to dismiss similar allegations concerning Wal-Mart’s 401(k) plan.86 Braden
claimed that Wal-Mart included funds with unreasonably high fees in its
401(k) plan, allegedly due in part to fee-sharing between the funds and

81 The basis for this litigation stems from the Supreme Court’s holding in LaRue v. DeWolff,
Boberg & Assocs., 552 U.S. 248, 250, 256 (2008), where the Court stated that “a participant in a
defined contribution pension plan [may] sue a fiduciary whose alleged misconduct impaired the
value of plan assets in the participant’s individual account.”
82 556 F.3d 575, 578 (7th Cir. 2009).
83 Id. at 579.
84 Id. at 586.
85 671 F.3d 314, 327 (3d Cir. 2011).
86 588 F.3d 585, 598 (8th Cir. 2009).
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Merrill Lynch, the plan’s trustee.87 Braden argued that this resulted in the
plan paying $20 million per year in excessive fees.88
The Eighth Circuit found that the plaintiff ’s complaint adequately alleged that Wal-Mart breached its fiduciary duty in selecting investment
options for the company’s 401(k) plan:
Taken as true, and considered as a whole, the complaint’s allegations can be
understood to assert that the Plan include[d] a relatively limited menu of
funds which were selected by Wal-Mart executives despite the ready availability of better options. The complaint allege[d], moreover, that these options were chosen to benefit the trustee at the expense of the participants.89

The court noted, in particular, that the Wal-Mart plan offered a limited
number of options, consisting of “ten mutual funds, a common/collective
trust, Wal-Mart common stock, and a stable value fund.”90 Comparing WalMart’s plan to Deere & Co.’s plan, which offered its participants access to
more than 2500 mutual funds, the court stated that the “far narrower range
of investment options available in this case makes more plausible the claim
that this Plan was imprudently managed.”91
These 401(k) fiduciary duty cases are premised on two critical assumptions. First, they assume that market forces adequately protect mutual fund
investors from excessive fees. Second, they reflect the courts’ perception
that employers best serve their employees’ interests by offering a large
menu of investment options. As the next Section suggests, research has cast
doubt upon the accuracy of both of these assumptions. In particular,
employers can easily sabotage their employees’ investment decisions by
offering plan choices that are too expensive, too complex, or simply too
numerous.92

87 Id. at 590. Following the court’s decision, Wal-Mart and Merrill Lynch agreed to a $13.5
million settlement of the litigation. See William P. Barrett, Walmart, Merrill Lynch Agree to Pay
$13.5 Million to Settle 401(k) Fiduciary Lawsuit, FORBES (Dec. 5, 2011), http://www.forbes.com/
sites/williampbarrett/2011/12/05/walmart-merrill-lynch-agree-to-pay-13-5-million-to-settle-401kfiduciary-lawsuit.
88 Wal-Mart, 588 F.3d at 590.
89 Id. at 596 (citation omitted).
90 Id. at 589.
91 Id. at 596 n.6.
92 See, e.g., Charles D. Ellis, Murder on the Orient Express: The Mystery of Underperformance, 68
FIN. ANALYSTS J., July–Aug. 2012, at 13, 13 (criticizing employers for investing in higher-cost
actively managed funds in a futile search for outperformance).
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II. THE LITERATURE ON INVESTOR DECISIONMAKING
Understanding consumer investment behavior is critical, because the
regulatory structure described above is based in part on assumptions about
how individuals make investment decisions. Empirical studies demonstrate
a wide variety of investor mistakes ranging from saving too little to trading
too frequently.93 Investors lack basic financial literacy, including the ability
to understand the effect of compound interest or to construct a diversified
portfolio. Our study focuses on a widely reported investor mistake: the
willingness to invest in high-fee funds despite evidence that such funds
consistently underperform the market. The persistence of this behavior
weighs against the claim that competition in the market for mutual funds
can keep fees low without regulatory oversight.
A. Cost-Sensitive Investing
Studies strongly suggest that, of the information available to retail investors, fund expenses are the best predictor of future returns and that
lower expenses are correlated with higher returns.94 Morningstar’s Director
of Mutual Fund Research has observed, “If there’s anything in the whole
world of mutual funds that you can take to the bank, it’s that expense ratios
help you make a better decision.”95 In one recent study, Michael Cooper,
Michael Halling, and Michael Lemmon found that, among the funds in
their sample, lower-fee funds outperformed otherwise observably identical
higher-fee funds by thirty-two percent.96
The literature in this area is extensive, and the results of some studies
conflict.97 Nonetheless, most studies find that high-fee funds underperform
93

See generally FED. RESEARCH DIV., LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, BEHAVIORAL PATPITFALLS OF U.S. I NVESTORS (2010) (summarizing economic studies of investor
mistakes).
94 See Fisch, supra note 18, at 1993 (summarizing studies showing that “the most consistent
predictor of a fund’s return to investors is the fund’s expense ratio”).
95 Russel Kinnel, How Expense Ratios and Star Ratings Predict Success, MORNINGSTAR (Aug.
9, 2010), http://news.morningstar.com/ARTICLENET/ARTICLE.ASPX?id=347327. Morningstar
compared the predictive power of its star ratings—which take into account expenses as well as
other variables—to expense ratios alone, and found that the expense ratio alone was a better
predictor of future fund performance than the star ratings in a majority of the years analyzed. Id.
96 Michael Cooper, Michael Halling & Michael Lemmon, Violations of the Law of One Fee
in the Mutual Fund Industry 14-15 (Mar. 28, 2013) (unpublished working paper), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1456079.
97 See Martijn Cremers et al., The Mutual Fund Industry Worldwide: Explicit and Closet
Indexing, Fees, and Performance 1 (Sept. 2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1830207
(surveying the conflicting literature regarding the relative value of passive versus active management of equity funds).
TERNS AND
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both their lower-fee competitors98 and passively managed index funds that
provide a market rate of return.99 Although there is evidence that some
managers have superior stock-picking ability that persists over time,100 many
studies find that managers are not able to beat the market over the long
run.101 Even if some funds consistently outperform the market, the percentage
of funds that do so appears to be quite small,102 and it is unlikely that the
average retail investor is capable of identifying outperformers.
Nonetheless, investors continue to purchase higher-fee funds. The reason for this behavior is unclear.103 Some investors appear to believe that
higher fees are correlated with better performance, in accordance with the
adage “you get what you pay for.”104 Other investors appear to underestimate

98 See generally Javier Gil-Bazo & Pablo Ruiz-Verdú, The Relation Between Price and Performance in the Mutual Fund Industry, 64 J. FIN. 2153 (2009); John A. Haslem, H. Kent Baker &
David M. Smith, Identification and Performance of Equity Mutual Funds with High Management Fees
and Expense Ratios, 16 J. INVESTING, Summer 2007, at 32; Cooper, Halling & Lemmon, supra note
96.
99 Martin J. Gruber, Another Puzzle: The Growth in Actively Managed Mutual Funds, 51 J. OF
FIN. 783, 789-91 (1996).
100 See K.J. Martijn Cremers & Antti Petajisto, How Active Is Your Fund Manager? A New
Measure That Predicts Performance, 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 3329 (2009) (finding that the most active
funds, as opposed to closet indexers, can outperform their benchmarks net of fees); see also
Malcolm Baker et al., Can Mutual Fund Managers Pick Stocks? Evidence from Their Trades Prior to
Earnings Announcements, 45 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 1111, 1129-30 (2010) (concluding
that mutual fund managers are able to trade profitably in part because they are able to forecast
earnings-related fundamentals); Robert Kosowski et al., Can Mutual Fund “Stars” Really Pick Stocks?
New Evidence from a Bootstrap Analysis, 61 J. FIN. 2551, 2553 (2006) (finding that a sizable minority
of managers pick stocks well enough to more than cover their costs).
101 See Nicolas P.B. Bollen & Jeffrey A. Busse, Short-Term Persistence in Mutual Fund Performance, 18 REV. FIN. STUD. 569, 594-95 (2004) (“After taking into account transaction costs and
taxes, investors may generate superior returns by following a naive buy-and-hold approach rather
than a performance-chasing strategy, even if short-term performance is predictable.”); Mark M.
Carhart, On Persistence in Mutual Fund Performance, 52 J. FIN. 57, 81 (1997) (finding that the bestperforming fund managers are “glamorize[d]” and the “mundane explanations of strategy and
investment costs account for almost all of the important predictability in mutual fund returns”);
Ronald N. Kahn & Andrew Rudd, Does Historical Performance Predict Future Performance?, 51 FIN.
ANALYSTS J., Nov.–Dec. 1995, at 43, 51 (1995) (finding that “the average underperformance of
fixed-income funds more than cancels out the benefits of being able to choose above-average funds
through persistence alone”).
102 See, e.g., Laurent Barras, Olivier Scaillet & Russ Wermers, False Discoveries in Mutual Fund
Performance: Measuring Luck in Estimated Alphas, 65 J. FIN. 179, 181 (2010) (finding that “the
proportion of skilled funds decreases from 14.4% in early 1990 to 0.6% in late 2006”).
103 The empirical findings may be complicated by the fact that some mutual fund fees are
directly used to market funds. Studies have shown that loads and 12b-1 fees have a positive effect
on market share. See Ajay Khorana & Henri Servaes, What Drives Market Share in the Mutual Fund
Industry?, 16 REV. FIN. 81, 110-11 (2012).
104 See Neil Weinberg, Fund Manager Knows Best, FORBES, Oct. 14, 2002, at 220, 220-21 (citing findings that eighty-four percent of investors believe higher-fee funds are better performers).
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the economic significance of fund fees.105 And for others, fees may be
presented in a manner that is too complex or difficult to find.106 As former
SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt testified before Congress in 1998, “Our own
research shows that fewer than one in five fund investors could give any
estimate of expenses for their largest mutual fund and fewer than one in six
fund investors understood that higher expenses can lead to lower returns.”107
These studies offer reason to question the degree to which the mutual
fund market is competitive, despite investors’ ability to redeem mutual fund
shares at any time for their net asset value and to replace those funds with
others that are competitively priced.108 The law of one price suggests that
similar products should have similar prices and that fee dispersion should
not persist unless products are truly different.109 Nonetheless, substantial
price dispersion persists in the mutual fund market—price dispersion that
does not appear to be explained by product differences.110 One recent study
found that, after controlling for fund characteristics, “the average spread in
105 See John Beshears et al., How Does Simplified Disclosure Affect Individuals’ Mutual Funds
Choices? (finding that their “subjects’ portfolio choices do not respond sensibly to loads and
redemption fees”), in EXPLORATIONS IN THE E CONOMICS OF AGING 75, 76 (David A. Wise
ed., 2011). One recent study finds that investors overwhelmingly rely on funds’ past performance
rather than cost information, and they select funds with high past performance even when cost
information is completely omitted. See Beth A. Pontari, Andrea J.S. Stanaland & Tom Smythe,
Regulating Information Disclosure in Mutual Fund Advertising in the United States: Will Consumers
Utilize Cost Information?, 32 J. CONSUMER POL’Y 333, 333-34 (2009).
106 See, e.g., Brad M. Barber, Terrance Odean & Lu Zheng, Out of Sight, Out of Mind: The
Effects of Expenses on Mutual Fund Flows, 78 J. BUS. 2095, 2117 (2005) (finding that investors have
learned to reject high load funds but continue to ignore operating expenses); see also Mark
Grinblatt et al., IQ and Mutual Fund Choice 35 (May 14 2013) (unpublished working paper),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2021957 (finding that investors with high IQs tend to avoid
higher-fee funds). But see James J. Choi, David Laibson & Brigitte C. Madrian, Why Does the Law
of One Price Fail? An Experiment on Index Mutual Funds, 23 REV. FIN. STUD. 1405, 1430 (2010)
(finding that almost none of the subjects minimized fees despite reporting the importance of fees,
and that minimizing search costs only modestly improved portfolio allocations).
107 Improving Price Competition for Mutual Funds and Bonds, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Fin.
And Hazardous Materials of the H. Comm. on Commerce, 105th Cong. 37 (1998) (statement of Hon.
Arthur Levitt, Chairman, SEC).
108 A number of articles argue that the mutual fund market is competitive. See, e.g., Khorana
& Servaes, supra note 103, at 110 (finding that higher-fee fund families have lower market shares);
Sunil Wahal & Albert (Yan) Wang, Competition Among Mutual Funds, 99 J. FIN. E CON. 40, 58
(2011) (finding that the mutual fund market, at least after 1998, has been competitive and that the
price competition introduced by new entrants reduces management fees).
109 See Choi, Laibson & Madrian, supra note 106, at 1406 (questioning whether demand for
nonportfolio services can justify higher fees).
110 See WALLISON & LITAN, supra note 10, at 63 (“Despite the fact that the actual services
of [mutual] funds are roughly the same, and their performance cannot be considered a significant
factor in investor choice, the expense ratios vary widely.”); see also Choi, Laibson & Madrian, supra
note 106, at 1411 (noting substantial fee variation among index funds that are designed to follow an
identical and largely mechanical investment strategy).
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residual fees (between the 1st and 99th percentile) across all funds over the
sample [was] 2.34%.”111 Another study found that, even in the absence of
product differences, investors failed to minimize fees.112
B. Diversification
In addition to evidence that investors do not choose funds based on
price, there is some evidence that investors do not choose at all—instead,
they simply divide their money among the available options, an approach
that has been termed “naïve diversification.”113 Benartzi and Thaler first
demonstrated this phenomenon in a series of experiments in 2001.114 They
found that subjects who were asked to make investment decisions had a
strong inclination to spread their money, essentially investing 1/n into each
of the n funds that was offered as investment choices, irrespective of the
particular choice set or the attributes of the options at hand.115
Research has also demonstrated that investors formulate their asset
allocation decisions based on the alternatives provided rather than by
independently determining an appropriate allocation.116 This approach has
been termed the “menu effect.”117 The menu effect, coupled with naïve
diversification, may lead investors to fail to reject even unattractive investment options. If investors do not reject less attractive options, offering them
a range of choices will not prevent poor investment decisions and may even
counterproductively induce them.
Finally, as noted above, policies that favor choice may be misguided,
given the evidence of the effect that too many choices have on decisionmaking quality. Investors express a preference for choosing from a large
assortment of products,118 but it is not clear that more choice is better for
investors’ retirement accounts. First, increasing the number of investment

111
112
113

Cooper, Halling & Lemmon, supra note 96, at 4.
Choi, Laibson & Madrian, supra note 106, at 1430.
Shlomo Benartzi & Richard H. Thaler, Naive Diversification Strategies in Defined Contribution Saving Plans, 91 AM. ECON. REV. 79 (2001).
114 Id.
115 Id. at 96.
116 See Ning Tang et al., The Efficiency of Sponsor and Participant Portfolio Choices in 401(k)
Plans, 94 J. PUB. ECON. 1073, 1081 (2010) (finding that investors fail to construct efficient
retirement portfolios, where efficiency is defined as maximizing the risk-adjusted return, and that
individual allocation strategies are even less efficient than using a 1/n heuristic).
117 Maureen Morrin et al., Saving for Retirement: The Effects of Fund Assortment Size and Investor Knowledge on Asset Allocation Strategies, 42 J. CONSUMER AFF. 206, 214 (2008).
118 Id. at 207.
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options increases investors’ tendency to invest in a large number of funds.119
Second, and more problematic, increasing the amount of choice actually
may lower employee participation rates. In one recent article, researchers
looked at a broad collection of data on investment decisions made by over
500,000 employees and found that increasing the number of investment
options decreased both equity allocation and overall investment levels.120
C. Proposed Mechanisms and Proposed Solutions for Investor Mistakes
Although the empirical literature identifies a variety of possible shortcomings in investor decisionmaking, the precise mechanisms driving
investors to choose high-fee funds remain unclear. One possibility is that
investment disclosure is inadequate. The SEC has repeatedly revised and
refined its disclosure requirements for mutual funds in an effort to address
the concern that investors do not choose their funds rationally.121 Yet one of
the more recent studies to examine the effectiveness of these reforms found
that the introduction of a shorter and simplified “summary prospectus” had
no effect on investor behavior.122
Another possibility is that investors are inadequately informed about the
task at hand or the fundamentals of investing. When investing for retirement, for example, employees are not typically provided with instructions
such as the appropriate number of options to choose or the correct allocation between equity and fixed income. Investors do not receive training in
the difference between active and passive management. Investors are not
even instructed as to the importance of fees in selecting among investment
alternatives. At an even more basic level, people are confused about the
math. Finance scholars Annamaria Lusardi and Olivia Mitchell noted that
half of the participants in a demographically diverse sample failed to realize
that mutual funds do not pay a guaranteed rate of return,123 and found that

119 See Morrin et al., Investing for Retirement: The Moderating Effect of Fund Assortment
Size of the 1/n Heuristic 27 ( Jan. 16, 2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://
ssrn.com/abstract=1008841 (“[C]onsidering a larger number of funds to invest in may be overwhelming for many investors, resulting in choosing more funds for investment and allocating the
invested dollars evenly across the chosen funds.”).
120 Sheena S. Iyengar & Emir Kamenica, Choice Proliferation, Simplicity Seeking, and Asset
Allocation, 94 J. PUB. ECON. 530, 530-38 (2010).
121 See Fisch, supra note 18, at 1968-69 (describing various SEC revisions to mutual fund
disclosure requirements).
122 Beshears et al., supra note 105, at 90.
123 Annamaria Lusardi & Olivia S. Mitchell, Financial Literacy and Retirement Preparedness:
Evidence and Implications for Financial Education, BUS. ECON., Jan. 2007, at 35, 37.
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fewer than twenty percent could correctly calculate a simple compound
interest problem.124
Even ideal disclosure requirements will have limited effectiveness,
though, if investors are unable to use the information provided.125 Lack of
investor education or overtaxed cognitive resources might explain the
inability of investors to estimate the costs associated with a one percent
difference in fees, for example, or the willingness of investors, even postEnron, to invest a substantial portion of their retirement accounts in
company stock. To the extent that these shortcomings are due to behavioral
biases, little effort has been made to overcome them.126 The literature
continually identifies the inability of investors to demonstrate a basic
understanding of investment principles, but little effort has been devoted to
determining how to improve that understanding.
Understanding the reasons for existing investor behavior is critical to
designing more effective regulatory approaches. As noted above, Congress
recognized as much when, as part of Dodd–Frank, it required the SEC to
conduct a study of investor financial literacy.127 The report of the study,
which the SEC released on August 30, 2012,128 was a disappointment.
Although Congress had directed the SEC to identify the existing level of
financial literacy among retail investors and to study such issues as designing more effective disclosure and identifying a strategy to improve financial
literacy, the SEC’s efforts were extremely limited.
The study concluded that U.S. retail investors “lack basic financial literacy.”129 Nevertheless, the SEC focused primarily on investor preferences
rather than attempting to identify mechanisms to improve the quality of
124
125

Id. at 38 fig.1.
See Jeff Schwartz, Reconceptualizing Investment Management Regulation, 16 GEO. MASON
L. REV. 521, 568-83 (2009) (arguing that, in the absence of investor education, SEC disclosure
rules do not lead investors to make better investment decisions).
126 In the one area in which such biases seem clear—the tendency of investors to place undue
weight on past performance—the regulatory response has been tepid. Rather than limiting
advertisements highlighting past performance, despite their substantial influence on investment
decisions, the SEC simply requires such advertisements to contain language informing investors
that “past performance does not guarantee future results.” Molly Mercer, Alan R. Palmiter &
Ahmed E. Taha, Worthless Warnings? Testing the Effectiveness of Disclaimers in Mutual Fund Advertisements, 7 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 429, 441-55 (2010) (explaining that advertising past
performance is highly effective and demonstrating that the current SEC disclaimer is too weak).
127 Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
§ 917, 124 Stat. 1376, 1836 (2010).
128 Press Release, SEC, SEC Issues Financial Literacy Study Mandated by the Dodd–Frank
Act (Aug. 30, 2012), available at http://www.sec.gov/News/PressRelease/Detail/PressRelease/
1365171484290#.UlAkO2TwJ8k.
129 SEC STAFF S TUDY, supra note 3, at iii.
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investor decisions. For example, the SEC conducted a substantial online
survey in which subjects were given investment information to review.130
The survey questioned the investors not on their understanding of the
material provided, but rather on their perception of the presentation and
complexity of the information provided. For example, rather than trying to
determine whether investors could reliably locate information contained in a
summary prospectus, the SEC asked them whether they found it difficult to
locate the information that they needed.131
Although the SEC study offered little of practical value, an improved
understanding of retail investor decisionmaking would assist regulators in
improving the manner in which $18.5 trillion of U.S. retirement assets are
invested.132 This information could also assist employers in designing
retirement plans to optimize allocation decisions by employees. Furthering
these objectives requires untangling the reasons for investor mistakes: Do
investors fail to identify the proper objectives? Are they unable to locate the
information that they need? Or are they unable to evaluate that information
accurately? Our experiment, described in the next Part, offers an initial step
toward obtaining this understanding.
III. OUR EXPERIMENT
To increase understanding of how retail investors make investment decisions, we designed an experiment to simulate the process of allocating a
retirement account among a selection of mutual funds. For our experiment,
we created a web-based user interface to provide subjects with ten fictional
mutual fund choices. Information about each of the choices was provided
through clickable links. Investors allocated an investment among the ten
funds and our software recorded their decisions. In addition, our software
required investors to click through the website in order to obtain specific
information about fund choices and their attributes. By collecting and
analyzing these clicks, we were able to identify the information that investors reviewed. After the subjects submitted their allocations, we collected
additional survey information about the subjects’ beliefs, risk preferences,
and investment experience, as well as demographic information.
130 Investors were given summary prospectuses of several actual mutual funds, but the fund
names were changed to the fictitious “Petunia Core Equity,” “Gardenia Asset Allocation Portfolio,”
and “Hydrangea Bush Government Bond Fund.” Id. at 98-99.
131 Id. at 100-01.
132 PETER BRADY, KIMBERLY BURHAM & SARAH HOLDEN, INV. CO. INST., THE
SUCCESS OF THE U.S. RETIREMENT SYSTEM 10-12 & fig.4 (2012), available at http://
www.ici.org/pdf/ppr_12_success_retirement.pdf (reporting U.S. retirement assets as of June 30, 2012).
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A. Study Design
Subjects were instructed to allocate an initial $10,000 among the ten
fund choices. The experiment did not permit subjects to submit an allocation unless their allocations totaled exactly 100% of the $10,000. The subjects
were told that they were investing for retirement and that the overall value
of their portfolios would be calculated based on a simulated thirty-year
performance. We attempted to provide an incentive for subjects to allocate
carefully by instructing them that they would be paid a bonus based on the
performance of the portfolio that they chose.133
Our fund allocation page (Figure 1) listed the ten mutual fund choices.
By clicking on the fund name, subjects accessed a fund information page
(Figure 2) that provided a brief description of the fund. In turn, the fund
information page contained four buttons allowing subjects to obtain information on four specific fund attributes: performance, risk, fees, and holdings. Each button allowed subjects to click through to obtain more detailed
information (Figure 3).
Figure 1: Fund Allocation Page

133

subjects.

See infra Section III.B for a description of the performance bonuses paid to each group of
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Figure 2: Fee Information Page, Money Market Fund

Figure 3: Performance Information, Money Market Fund

The information provided for each fund was presented in an identical
and highly simplified format. Our study focused on information- and
motivation-based reasons for investor mistakes rather than on cognitive
reasons for such mistakes. As a result, we highlighted the information that
might conceivably be relevant to the investment decision and made that
information directly comparable across the fund options.
Performance information included a graph showing the fund’s ten-year
performance as well as the performance of the S&P 500 (over the same
hypothetical time period) and a chart showing annualized one-, three-, and
five-year returns. Fee information consisted of a single number showing the
fund’s current expense ratio. Our study was specifically constructed to
reduce the likelihood that investors would make choices based on confusion
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or inability to understand the fee disclosure.134 Risk description language
was taken from real mutual fund prospectuses, and the holdings page listed
each fund’s top ten holdings and showed the percentage of fund assets
invested in each—again modeled on actual funds.
As noted above, the funds in the experiment were modeled on real world
funds—fee levels, holdings, and descriptive language were taken from real
mutual fund documents. The choice to construct fictional funds was driven
in part by a desire to avoid the potentially distortionary effect of the 2008
Financial Crisis on reported fund performance. In addition, using fictional
funds also enabled us to control the degree to which funds differed from
each other. For example, we constructed several fund pairs that varied across
only a single dimension, such as fees.
We gave our funds generic names such as the Smith Fund, much like
those used in the SEC study of investor literacy,135 to avoid the possibility
that investors would infer information about fund style or strategy from the
names of the funds.136 On the fund allocation page, we also randomly varied
the order in which funds appeared within their fund categories. A simplified
presentation of fund attributes appears in Table 1.

134 We did not include loads, 12b-1 fees, sponsor fee waivers, or other types of expenses. John
Haslem, Kent Baker, and David Smith have argued that investors lack the information they need
to make efficient fund choices because the expense ratio does not break out all costs or include all
cost categories. Haslem, Baker & Smith, supra note 98, at 34-37.
135 See supra note 130.
136 See Michael J. Cooper, Huseyin Gulen & P. Raghavendra Rau, Changing Names with Style:
Mutual Fund Name Changes and Their Effects on Fund Flows, 60 J. FIN. 2825, 2825, 2827 (2005)
(finding investors directed money into funds that changed their names to reflect a “hot investment
style”).
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Table 1: Fund Attributes

Fund

Type

Five-year
Return

Fees

2.89%

.43%

1

Money Market

2

Money Market

2.91%

.43%

3

Fixed Income

7.50%

.87%

4

Fixed Income

5.41%

.83%

5

Equity Index

8.67%

.10%

6

Equity Index

8.62%

.45%

7

Managed Equity

9.10%

.61%

8

Managed Equity

8.67%

.61%

9

Managed Equity

9.00%

1.62%

10

Managed Equity

9.70%

2.10%

We collected information on how subjects allocated their $10,000 as well
as the specific clicks that each subject made in order to view additional
information about the funds. After the subjects submitted their allocations,
they were asked to answer a series of questions about their investment
beliefs, risk preferences, and investment experience. Subjects were also
asked to supply demographic information and to identify “the most important factor in [their] choice of retirement funds in this study.”
After completing the questionnaire, subjects received a message showing
the final value of their retirement portfolio. The website calculated this
value by using a rough algorithm that simulated fund returns over thirty
years. Returns were ranked by asset class.137 Consistent with our hypothesis,
funds within each class were ranked so that funds with lower fees yielded
higher returns. Because we were agnostic, for the purposes of this study,
about the relative merits of professionally managed funds versus passive
indexing,138 we structured the returns of our lowest-cost index fund and
137 Equity funds paid a higher return than bond funds, which paid more than money market
funds. Our algorithm also included an adjustment factor for risk, a component of our experiment
that will be analyzed in a separate article.
138 Commentators generally agree that retail investors should prefer passively managed funds
both because of their lower costs and because investors lack the ability to select among mutual
fund managers. See, e.g., Rick Ferri, Indexes Beat Active Funds Again in S&P Study, FORBES (Oct.
11, 2012), http://www.forbes.com/sites/rickferri/2012/10/11/indexes-beat-active-funds-again-in-spstudy (detailing the consistent underperformance of actively managed funds and portfolios).

2014]

631

Why Do Retail Investors Make Costly Mistakes?

actively managed equity fund to be identical on a cost-adjusted basis. The
distribution of possible portfolio values and fees is shown in Table 2.
Table 2: Distribution of Possible Fees and Payouts
Maximum portfolio value (100% invested in highest
performing fund)
Minimum portfolio value (100% invested in lowest
performing fund)
Portfolio value with 10% invested in each fund

$76,120
$15,630
$38,989–$49,543

Maximum fee (100% invested in highest fee fund)

2.10%

Minimum fee (100% invested in lowest fee fund)

.10%

Average fee (effective fee with 10% invested in each fund)

.81%

B. Subjects
Our study drew from two subject pools. Table 3 contains basic demographic information on each group of subjects. The first group of subjects
consisted of undergraduate students, graduate students, and some staff
members who took the study at the University of Pennsylvania’s Wharton
Behavioral Lab (WBL). The WBL draws primarily undergraduate subjects
from across the University of Pennsylvania campus. Its subjects are not
limited to students affiliated with the Wharton business program.
The second group of subjects signed up through Amazon Mechanical
Turk (MTurk) and took the study online. Although some scholars have
raised questions about the external validity of online subject pools like
MTurk that pay subjects very small amounts of money for completing
minor tasks and short questionnaires,139 others have found that they are
comparable to other survey panels.140 Our goal in this study was to simulate
the allocation decision faced by ordinary employees when choosing among
investment options in their 401(k) plans. Using subjects who may have
139 See Armin Falk & Ernst Fehr, Why Labour Market Experiments?, 10 LAB. ECON. 399, 402
(2003) (exploring the role of stake levels in experimental pools); see also Ernst Fehr & John A.
List, The Hidden Costs and Returns of Incentives—Trust and Trustworthiness Among CEOs, 2 J. EUR.
ECON. ASS’N 743, 764-65 (2004) (finding differences in the behavior of students and CEOs in
studies concerning the effect of incentives).
140 See, e.g., Gabriele Paolacci, Jesse Chandler & Panagiotis G. Ipeirotis, Running Experiments
on Amazon Mechanical Turk, 5 JUDGMENT & DECISION MAKING 411, 412 (2010) (“Internet
subject populations tend to be closer to the U.S. population as a whole than subjects recruited
from traditional university subject pools.”).
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below-average means or sophistication is appropriate for a study that seeks
to describe and address the investment choices of employees with little
specialized knowledge or investment experience.141
Table 3: Subject Demographics, by Subject Pool
MTurk

WBL

197

201

32

20

52%

67%

Percent owning a mutual fund

43.1%

12.9%

Percent owning a retirement account

54.9%

8.5%

Percent with college education

58.4%

33.8%

Percent reporting somewhat to very
stable income

67.0%

71.6%

Total number of subjects
Median age
Percent female

We incentivized our subjects to select funds carefully by providing a
performance-based bonus. MTurk participants were paid a base rate of one
dollar for completing the study and an additional one dollar bonus if their
portfolio values were above the median in their subject pool. Subjects who
participated in the study via the WBL were paid a ten dollar showup fee for
a session that included this experiment as well as other studies. Participants
were instructed that they would also receive bonus payments proportionate
to their total portfolio values at the end of the session—one dollar for every
$10,000 in their portfolios (rounded to the nearest quarter).
C. Experimental Manipulation
We focus on investors’ consideration of fees in their allocation decisions,
in part because of the extensive controversy over the extent to which
investment decisions provide market discipline and in part because of the
legal implications of the answer to this question. To test the potential for
education to affect investors’ consideration of fees, our study contained an
experimental manipulation. Specifically, we divided our subjects randomly
into three groups—Performance, Fees, and Control. We provided subjects

141 We note that the self-reported education level of MTurk subjects is higher than that of
the general population. See id.
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in the Fees group with an instruction designed to focus investors’ attention
on the importance of considering fee information in the selection process.
The Fees Condition Instruction read as follows:
In making your investment decision, you may want to consider the following information: the most important single factor in mutual fund performance is the fund’s operating expenses (in other words, its fees).

We provided subjects in the Performance Group with an instruction
comparable to the instruction required by the SEC.
The Performance Condition Instruction read as follows:
In making your investment decision, you may want to consider the following information: studies have shown that past performance does not predict
future returns.

Subjects in the Control group did not receive any additional instruction.
Because of the complex relationship between fees and performance, as
noted in Part II above, we consider the effect of the performance instruction
in other work. We report here only on the comparison of the Fees Group
and the Control Group.
As a robustness check, we also asked participants who received a special
instruction in the questionnaire portion of the experiment to identify the
instruction they received from a list of seven alternatives.142
IV. STUDY RESULTS
A. Overall Descriptive Results
We report data from 197 MTurk subjects and 201 WBL subjects. Because
of the demographic differences between our groups, we report results
separately. Basic descriptive results, which also reflect some significant
differences between the two subject groups, are reported in Table 4 below.
To summarize, our overall results provide a basis for guarded optimism.
First, we found that investors understood the general objectives and design
of the study. They invested, in the aggregate, the most money in the two
funds that we had designed to be the most efficient investment options: the
low-cost equity index fund and the low-cost actively managed fund. Second,
we found that investors diversified—probably excessively—but that there

142 49.2% of the MTurk participants and 57.2% of the WBL participants correctly identified
the special instruction they received.

634

[Vol. 162: 605

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

was segmentation within our investor pool. Third, we found that the fee
instruction mattered. These results are considered in more detail below.
Table 4: Basic Descriptive Means, by Subject Pool

Minutes logged in
Total clicks
Mean clicks on fees
Mean clicks on risk
Mean clicks on holdings
Mean clicks on performance
Total number of funds invested in
Percent investing in all ten funds
Percent correctly identifying own condition
Average portfolio value
Average pay

MTurk

WBL

12.70
34.30
6.86
4.70
3.25
7.98
6.39
27.9%
49.2%
$47,679
$1.50

11.30
59.00
11.77
9.32
7.08
13.76
7.33
32.4%
57.2%
$48,839
$4.91

As shown in Table 4, the WBL subjects accessed a much higher quantity
of information, clicking through many more links. The MTurk subjects
invested in fewer overall funds and were less likely to invest in all ten funds.
We also note here, as is reflected in the significance tests below, that there is
generally more variance in the data from the MTurk subjects.
Figure 4 shows the mean investment across conditions in each fund. Figure 5 shows the overall distribution across subjects of the debt/equity split.
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Figure 4: Histogram Showing Mean Percentage (Aggregated Across
Conditions) of Portfolio Invested in Each Fund, by Subject Pool
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Figure 5: Histogram Showing Mean Percentage (Aggregated Across
Conditions) of Total Portfolio Invested in Equity, by Subject Pool
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B. Investment Patterns
Before discussing the results of our experimental manipulation, we observe some overall patterns in how subjects chose funds across conditions in
order to get a sense of subjects’ baseline preferences and strategies. First, we
note that most subjects chose a reasonable debt/equity balance.143 In addition, the most popular investments were the two investments that should
have been the most attractive—the low-fee index fund and the low-fee
managed fund. Figure 5 shows the mean investment in each fund, by
subject pool. Note that Figure 6 shows the means aggregated across conditions, but the overall pattern is the same if we look only at subjects in the
Control group.
Second, we see substantial evidence of a strong preference for diversification, naïve or otherwise.144 From these patterns of investment, it seems
clear that subjects were not trying to pick funds. We expected that investors
would attempt to identify the best fund in each category and then invest in
a total of two or three funds, depending on the extent to which they wanted
to diversify between fixed income and equity, and between passive and
active investment strategies—subjects about which we remained agnostic for
purposes of this study. Instead, we found that only 7.5% of WBL and 17.8%
of MTurk subjects chose three or fewer funds.
The results on diversification are less discouraging than they might appear from the aggregated statistics. Specifically, we see segmentation within
our subject pools. As Figure 4 demonstrates, our aggregate results on
diversification combine different investment patterns. In the WBL pool, for
example, about a third of subjects invested in four to six funds total, and
only a third invested in all ten funds. Although the subjects who invested in
all ten funds—those who diversified most naïvely—do not appear to differ
from our other subjects along the dimensions captured by our study, we
suspect that these are different kinds of investors and that this market may
be segmented in some important ways that we flag here for future research.
More problematic, naïve diversification may explain a number of investment decisions that otherwise appear irrational or uninformed. For
example, our study contained two index funds that were described as
identical except for fees—they tracked the same index, contained the same
holdings, and reported the same past performance. Overall, 74.6% of WBL
participants and 65.2% of MTurk participants who invested in the low-fee
index fund also invested in the high-fee index fund. Similarly, 68% of
143
144

See supra Figure 5.
See supra notes 113-115 and accompanying text.
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MTurk investors allocated at least some money to a higher-fee actively
managed fund that was really just a closet index fund, in that its holdings
and performance were identical to those reported by the index funds. This
was also true of 74.1% of WBL subjects. On a somewhat different point,
79.6% of WBL and 74.1% of MTurk investors allocated at least some money
to a money market fund. They did so despite the instruction to invest for a
thirty-year time frame for which liquidity concerns should be minimal.
Notably, the reported returns of the money market funds were significantly
lower than the other fixed income alternatives.
C. Response to Fee Instruction
In this Section, we analyze the effect of the fee instruction on subjects’
beliefs and choices. Here, we compare the responses of the seventy-two
WBL subjects assigned to the Fees condition with the responses of the sixty
subjects assigned to the Control condition. Separately, we compare the
responses of sixty-four MTurk subjects in the Fees condition with sixty-five
in the Control condition.145 As noted above, we exclude subjects in the
Performance group from this set of analyses.146
We found that investors who received the fee instruction differed from
the Control group along three dimensions. First, they sought more information about fees. Second, they reported believing that fees were more
important. Third, they shifted their allocations toward lower-cost funds.147
1. Search for Information: Fee Clicks
The fee disclosure significantly affected how subjects collected and used
fee information. As Table 5 indicates, subjects in the Fees group were much
more likely to look at a fund’s fees. On average, WBL subjects in the Fees
group clicked forty percent more on the fees buttons—meaning that they
145 We also analyzed gender differences. Men and women in the WBL subject pool did not
differ on any of the primary dependent variables, including portfolio composition and clicking
patterns. Women in the MTurk pool invested significantly more in safe (fixed income) funds than
men did (34.8% versus 27.4%, p=.015).
146 As a general matter, the behavior of those subjects who received the Performance instruction was similar to that of the Control group. For our primary variables, including fee clicks,
average fee paid, and the importance of fees and investment in the lowest and highest fee funds,
the results of the Performance group were statistically indistinguishable from the Control group.
The Performance instruction did generate marginal differences in the investors’ allocation among
the various funds.
147 All statistical tests reported here are two-sided t-tests, comparing the variable means
across conditions. We report the results of the main statistical tests of significance in tables,
including means, t-statistics, degrees of freedom (d.f.), and p-value.
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viewed fee information forty percent more often—than subjects in the
control group. The increase was even more dramatic for subjects from the
MTurk pool, where subjects in the Fees group clicked on the fee disclosure
more than twice as often as subjects in the Control group. In both subject
pools, the fee instruction caused investors to search for more fee information than did the Control group.
Table 5: Fee Clicks by Condition, for WBL and MTurk Samples

Fee clicks, WBL
Fee clicks, MTurk

Fees
Group Mean

Control
Group Mean

t

d.f.

p

14.82
9.36

10.40
4.09

3.10
4.37

129.62
101.87

.002
.000

2. Beliefs About the Importance of Fees
The fee instruction also affected subjects’ beliefs about the importance
of fund fees. We report group means and significance statistics for WBL
participants in Table 6, and for MTurk participants in Table 7. The effects
were very similar across subject pools. Overall, in both subject pools,
subjects in the Fees condition were less likely than subjects in the Control
group to agree that a fund’s fees do not affect returns and were substantially
more likely to report that operating expenses were the most important
factor in fund performance.
The most dramatic impact of the fee instruction was on the subjects’
self-reported identification of the most important criterion in their selection
among the investment alternatives. In both subject pools, the instruction
caused a significant reduction in the number of subjects who reported
diversification as the most important consideration and a corresponding
increase in the percentage of subjects who reported that fees were the most
important consideration. Notably, the fee instruction appeared to be new
information to the MTurk subjects, as well as to the Wharton students,
despite the fact that the MTurk subjects were significantly more experienced investors, with more than half reporting that they have a retirement
account.
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Table 6: Beliefs and Preferences by Condition, WBL Subjects

Fees do not affect returns
Operating expenses most
important in performance
Most important is fees
Most important is diversity

Fees
Group
Mean

Control
Group
Mean

t

d.f.

p

3.04
4.31

3.53
3.16

1.97
4.38

129.99
129.35

.051
.000

27.8%
30.6%

6.7%
53.3%

3.39
2.68

114.67
121.53

.001
.008

Table 7: Beliefs and Preferences by Condition, MTurk Subjects

Fees do not affect returns
Operating expenses most
important in performance
Most important is fees
Most important is diversity

Fees
Group
Mean

Control
Group
Mean

t

d.f.

p

2.61
4.28

3.48
3.25

3.43
4.75

124.22
85.95

.001
.000

35.9%
31.3%

4.6%
50.8%

4.75
2.27

85.95
126.55

.000
.024

3. Fund Selection
Because our experiment required our subjects to make an investment
decision, the effect of the fee instruction on that decision is arguably the
most important component of our experiment. It is arguably also the most
important aspect of our study with respect to real-world policy choices, in
that it measures the potential ability of an instruction to affect investor
behavior rather than simply attitudes or beliefs. Because of the importance
of this question, we designed our study to measure potential effects in several
ways. Results are summarized in Table 8 (WBL) and Table 9 (MTurk).
First, for each subject, we determined the asset-weighted average mutual
fund fee that the subject’s account would have paid at the time of the
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subject’s investment allocation.148 For example, a subject who invested half
of his money in a fund with a .1% fee and half in the fund with a 2.1% fee
had an average fund fee of 1.1%. By this measure, the fee instruction had a
clear impact. In both pools, subjects in the Fees group selected portfolios
charging a lower average fee than subjects in the Control group. Perhaps
more importantly, the average fee difference between conditions was significant even when we look only at fees paid on equity funds (Funds 5-10).
The fee instruction also affected the subjects’ choices among specific
investment alternatives. The Fees group invested a higher percentage of
their portfolio in the lowest-fee fund and a lower percentage of their
portfolio in the highest-fee fund than the Control group (though the latter
difference is not significant in the MTurk group). They also invested more
in index funds and less in managed funds than their Control counterparts.
Notably, those in the Fees group invested more in the lower-fee index fund
than those in the Control group, but they did not invest more in the higherfee index fund than those in the Control group, suggesting that their
investment shift resulted from a concern about fees rather than a preference
for passively—over actively—managed funds.
Table 8: Fund Selection by Condition, WBL

Average Total Fees Paid
(asset-weighted)
Average Fees Paid in Equity
(asset-weighted)
Index Funds (5-6)
Managed Funds (7-10)
Fixed Income Funds (3-4)
Money Market (1-2)
Average Percent of Portfolio
Invested in Lowest-Fee Fund
Average Percent of Portfolio
Invested in Highest-Fee Fund

Fees
Group
Mean

Control
Group
Mean

t

d.f.

p

.66%

.80%

3.27

129.50

.001

.70%

.84%

2.61

129.77

.010

34.12
40.81
13.76
18.44
23.50%

25.55
48.40
16.58
16.14
15.70%

2.70
2.46
1.74
1.17
3.18

129.77
129.90
129.99
126.44
119.20

.008
.015
.085
.246
.002

7.15%

11.42%

2.31

115.34

.022

148 Differences in fund performance would cause the average fee to vary over the thirty years
of the simulation.
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Table 9: Fund Selection by Condition, MTurk

Average Total Fees Paid
(asset-weighted)
Average Fees Paid in Equity
(asset-weighted)
Index Funds (5-6)
Managed Funds (7-10)
Fixed Income Funds (3-4)
Money Market funds (1-2)
Average Percent of Portfolio
Invested in Lowest-Fee Fund
Average Percent of Portfolio
Invested in Highest-Fee Fund

Fees
Group
Mean

Control
Group
Mean

t

d.f.

p

.68%

.79%

2.21

125.60

.028

.70%

.84%

2.32

124.29

.023

29.76
38.65
12.38
19.21
21.10%

22.45
46.85
13.82
15.88
13.90%

2.01
1.93
1.20
1.11
2.17

118.40
120.41
126.97
112.47
115.94

.047
.056
.232
.268
.032

7.55%

10.42%

1.38

126.08

.170

D. Diversification
Finally, we considered the extent to which the fee instruction affected
the propensity of the subjects to engage in a naïve diversification strategy.
Table 10 compares the concentration of funds by condition, using a concentration measure based on each fund’s Euclidean distance from the perfectly
even distribution.149 This concentration measure assesses the degree to
which a subject’s portfolio differed from the naïve 1/n investment strategy.150
The results here illustrate most dramatically the limitations of our fee
instruction. For both subject pools, subjects in the Fees group had more
concentrated portfolios than those in the Control group—that is, their
149 See Beshears et al., supra note 105, at 87-88 (using a similar experimental design). Concentration is measured by the square root of the sum of the squared differences between the actual
allocations and the even distribution (.10, .10, .10, .10, .10, .10, .10, .10, .10, .10). The most diversified portfolio would be zero, and the most concentrated portfolio (100% in one fund, 0 in nine
funds) is .949.
150 We also measured diversification using the Herfindahl–Hirschman index, typically employed to measure the concentration of market power in an industry, which simply sums the
squared percentage allocated to each fund. Herfindahl–Hirschman Index, DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
http://justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/hhi.html (last visited Jan. 24, 2014). This measure also
yielded statistically significant differences in concentration by condition, at p=.028 for the WBL
subject pool and p=.067 for the MTurk pool.
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portfolios looked less like the paradigmatic naïvely diversified allocation.
However, even though both groups’ allocations were more concentrated,
subjects did not actually invest in significantly fewer total funds. MTurk
subjects invested a positive amount in a median of six total funds, and the
median for WBL subjects was even higher, at eight total funds. In both
cases, the mean number of funds invested in was slightly lower for the Fees
group than for the Control group, but not significantly so. In addition,
although subjects responded to the instruction by reducing their allocations
to high-fee funds, they did not shift out of high-fee funds entirely.
Table 10: Concentration of Investments, by Condition,
for Both Subject Pools

Concentration, WBL
Concentration, MTurk

Fees
Group
Mean

Control
Group
Mean

t

d.f.

p

.333
.376

.287
.315

1.98
1.75

128.47
122.78

.050
.082

E. Robustness: Subjects with Investment Experience
In our last analysis, we consider how the fee instruction affected a particular subgroup of subjects who we predict would be less in need of investor education. Because the MTurk subjects were not primarily drawn from a
student population, we look here specifically at the subgroup of the sample
who had investment experience. Of the 197 MTurk subjects, 54.8% reported
that they had a retirement account for which they made investment decisions. Noting at the outset that tests of the experimental manipulation on
this subgroup are less powerful because the sample size is smaller, we found
that the fee instruction affected decisionmaking even when investors were
not entirely new to investing.
Looking only at experienced investors, the fee instruction increased subjects’ clicks on fee links from 3.9 to 8.7 clicks (t=3.14, d.f.=58.12, p=.003).
Those who saw the fee instruction paid a significantly lower total fee (.63%
vs. .75%) than those in the Control group (t=2.13, d.f.=71.00, p=.037). The
instruction made subjects invest slightly, though not significantly, more in
the lowest-fee fund (p=.237) and slightly less in the highest-fee fund (mean
difference=3.8%, t=1.85, d.f.=64.16, p=.069). Experienced subjects in the
Fees group were also much more likely to report that the most important
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consideration was operating expenses, in comparison to experienced subjects in the Control group (percent difference=30.8, t=3.46, d.f.=48.84,
p=.001).
V. IMPLICATIONS AND NEXT STEPS
This study constitutes preliminary research. Consequently, our ability to
generalize from our results is limited. As noted above, our study contained a
number of simplifications and design choices that we will investigate further
through additional research.
In particular, we deliberately designed our study, in contrast to other
experimental studies (and the real world of investing), to make fee information simple, accessible, and comparable. Our simplification was designed
to enable us to differentiate between a cognitive failure—the inability to
understand fee information—and a motivational failure—indifference to
fees even when the fee information is clear and available. Our results
suggest that subjects who are not motivated to seek and use fee information
will fail to do so even when cognitive barriers are minimal.
The simplification of fee information, in the absence of a fee instruction,
appeared to be of limited value. Without the fee instruction, our subjects
tended to diversify among the investment options provided, to pay average
fees, and to obtain average performance from their investments. This
finding suggests that the SEC’s emphasis on improving disclosure, at least
in the absence of improved investor education, may be misplaced.
Our interpretation of these results is that investor ignorance of the economic significance of mutual fund fees limits investors’ use of fee information to choose among investment alternatives. Mutual fund fees are
presented in fractions of a percent, and investors may assume that the real
cost of such fees is negligible.151 Our study predicts that, if investors are
instructed about the importance of fees, they will be more attentive to fees
in choosing among funds.
In a small follow-up study, we explored the extent to which inattention
to fees might be the result of limited investor financial literacy. A twominute questionnaire asked subjects to estimate the difference in value of
two thirty-year investments of $10,000 with an average (before fees) rate of

151 Such an assumption is, of course, mistaken. An investor who invests $10,000 in a retirement account that earns an 8% return (before fees) for thirty years and that charges a .5% fee will
have more than $85,000 in retirement savings. If the fees are 2% instead, that same account will be
worth less than $55,000.
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return of 8%, one with a 1% fee, and the other with a 2% fee.152 The correct
answer was approximately $20,000. The median response was $3000, and
almost forty percent of subjects underestimated the effect of the fee by an
order of magnitude. This is a very rough way to picture how individuals
approach the complex compound interest problem. Nonetheless, it suggests
a possible explanation for why investors do not change their behavior in
response to simplified fee information: they do not think that fees, which
seem very small, will have a big effect on funds’ returns.
Limited investor understanding of the magnitude of the fee impact may
also explain why our subjects’ response to the fee instruction was limited.
Although the instruction stated that fees were important, it neither told
investors why nor quantified the effect of a small fee differential. Even if
investors are told that fees matter, our small study suggests that they may
underestimate the importance of small fee differences. A more explicit
instruction, such as one indicating that small differences in fees between
funds can lead to payouts that differ by as much as thirty-five percent over
the life of a retirement account, may have a greater effect on investor
behavior. We intend, through future research, to experiment with varying
the nature of the fee instruction in order to determine whether we can
thereby improve its effectiveness.153
Consistent with the literature, our findings about the extent of diversification seem to confirm a high degree of naïve diversification. We are
particularly troubled by the frequency with which investors allocate money
to both members of a pair-wise set of funds in which one alternative is
objectively inferior to the other. Our findings suggest that an employer’s
burden in designing an appropriate 401(k) plan may be especially difficult
because the inclusion of even a few poor or more costly investment choices
in a plan can harm investors who are unable to identify and eliminate such
funds. Our findings also suggest that investors do not fully understand the
objective of diversification. Here, as with fees, we intend to explore the
152 The study was a short survey on MTurk, in which 185 subjects were paid $.75 and half
received a $.25 bonus for above-average accuracy. Before seeing the main question, they were told,

When you buy shares of a mutual fund, as many people do when they choose a retirement portfolio, a percentage of the investment goes toward the mutual fund’s annual
operating expenses—in other words, mutual funds charge investors a yearly fee
which is automatically deducted from investor accounts. In this task, you are being
asked to estimate the total cost of a mutual fund’s fees over a long time period.
They were instructed to answer the question quickly and without using a calculator.
153 Cf. Mercer, Palmiter & Taha, supra note 126, at 455 (conducting an experiment to vary the
strength of performance disclaimers and finding that strongly worded disclaimers were more
effective).
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extent to which information and instructions can improve the quality of
investor decisions.
Our results with respect to both fees and diversification raise broader
questions about the extent to which retail investors understand the investment process. Efficient retirement investing demands that investors understand not only basic principles of costs and diversification, but also the
effect of compounding, the value of asset allocation, and the consequences
of these choices for investing over a thirty-year (or longer) time horizon.
Our next study will focus to a larger degree on investor cognition in an
effort to distinguish between investors’ failure to set appropriate objectives
from their inability to meet their objectives.
Our study raises a particular concern that investors (and employers as
well) do not understand what they are supposed to do in investing for
retirement. Given our subjects’ expressed levels of discomfort with the
investment process, we predict that, rather than attempting to understand
these concepts, investors search for short-cuts, heuristics, and opportunities
to delegate. Indeed, studies show that an increasing number of retirement
investors attempt to delegate their investment decisions by choosing
actively managed mutual funds, target-date funds, or professionally managed accounts.154 Delegating responsibility for investment decisions makes
investors vulnerable to the choices of professionals—choices that may be
opaque, shielded from market discipline, or tainted by conflicts of interest.
The popularity of target-date funds in 401(k) plans is one example. Target-date funds provide investors with a gradual shift from equity to fixed
income as the investor nears retirement age, thereby relieving investors of
the burden of determining how to allocate their assets appropriately.155
When the financial crisis hit, investors learned that different target-date
funds had widely varied approaches to asset allocation and were far riskier
than investors had believed.156 Similarly, target-date funds vary substantially
154 See More 401(k) Participants Turning to Professionals for Help, FINANCIAL PLANNING
( June 27, 2012), http://www.financial-planning.com/news/more-401k-participants-turning-toprofessional-for-help-vanguard-says-2679595-1.html (stating that more than one-third of
Vanguard’s 401(k) plan participants turned their accounts over to professional money managers);
Elizabeth O’Brien, 10 Things 401(k) Plans Won’t Tell You, MARKETWATCH (Feb. 23, 2013),
http://www.marketwatch.com/story/10-things-401k-plans-wont-tell-you-2012-11-09 (reporting that
employees invest almost three times as much money in actively managed equity funds as they do
in index funds, despite the higher cost of actively managed funds).
155 See Gwendolyn A. Williamson, Retirement Product Disclosure Rules and the Impact on Mutual
Fund Distribution, 19 INVESTMENT LAW., Oct. 2012, at 26, 28-29 (discussing common investor
misunderstandings regarding target-date funds).
156 See id. (noting that these concerns led the SEC to develop a rulemaking proposal for
target-date funds); see also Investment Company Advertising: Target Date Retirement Fund

646

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

[Vol. 162: 605

in terms of fees and complexity—one article reports that fees range from
less than .2% to more than 1%.157 Existing regulatory provisions encourage
employees to invest in target-date funds, but our analysis suggests that,
because these funds may purport to relieve investors of the need to evaluate
costs and risks, employer obligations to screen such choices more carefully
should perhaps be greater.
Our study has important implications for plan design. Courts and commentators, such as the Wal-Mart court, suggest that retirement plan design
should focus on offering employees a broad array of choices that include
several low-cost options. If investors do not avoid inferior investment
options, however, the inclusion of inferior options, even alongside better
alternatives, may be problematic. In addition, the menu of options offered
may influence investors’ allocations, cause investors to select too many
funds, or paralyze investors altogether.
Finally, the limited attention our subjects paid to fund fees casts doubt
on the claim, as reflected in Judge Easterbrook’s opinion in Jones,158 that
market competition renders judicial oversight of fees unnecessary. The
relative insensitivity of investors to economically important fee differences
suggests a market failure—one that cannot readily be addressed by the
SEC’s current focus on expanded disclosure.
CONCLUSION
Many studies have identified biases or mistakes in consumers’ real-world
investment decisions. Regulatory changes that have increased individual
responsibility for retirement savings and investment choices magnify the
consequences of these mistakes. The extent to which disclosures, investor
education, or other strategies can address these mistakes is a critical policy
concern.
We constructed an experiment designed to inform the process of regulatory design by developing a greater understanding of investor decisionmaking behavior. The study has important implications for future regulatory
policy. First, our results contribute evidence that investor choice, without
more, does little to protect investors or to produce efficient investment
Names and Marketing, Securities Act Release No. 9126, Exchange Act Release No. 62,300,
Investment Company Act Release No. 29,301, 75 Fed. Reg. 35,920 (proposed June 23, 2010)
(proposing increased disclosure requirements in connection with the marketing of target-date
funds).
157 Pat Regnier, 3 Things to Know About Target-Date Funds, CNNMONEY ( July 31, 2012),
http://money.cnn.com/2012/07/31/retirement/target-date-fund-risks.moneymag/index.htm.
158 See supra note 11.
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decisions. Second, our study casts doubt on the claim that poor investor
decisions are the result of lengthy or confusing disclosure documents and
suggests that simplified disclosure, without more, is unlikely to affect
investor behavior significantly. Third, our findings suggest a research agenda
for improving investor literacy.
The experimental manipulation in this study, although modest, significantly affected both investor behavior and beliefs. Our results suggest that
offering investor education, even in the form of a simple instruction, can
make a substantial difference.

